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UNCONSTITUTIONAL OR IMPOSSIBLE: THE
IRRECONCILABLE GAP BETWEEN
MANAGED CARE AND DUE PROCESS IN
MEDICAID AND MEDICARE
Jennifer L. Wright*

THESIS AND ABSTRACT

Managed care, as currently constituted, is inherently unconstitutional in
the Medicaid and Medicare context. The due process rights of Medicaid
and Medicare beneficiaries are violated because each medical treatment
decision is conflated with a Medicaid/Medicare coverage decision, and
these decisions are made by care providers and managed care
organizations that are subject to systematic incentives to deny even
covered care. Medicaid and Medicare coverage decisions are subject to
constitutional due process requirements which, at a minimum, include the
requirement of an unbiased decision maker. For managed care to pass
constitutional muster in the Medicaid and Medicare contexts, the
coverage decision must be made by a decision maker who is not subject to
incentives to deny necessary care. The constitutional infirmity of
managed care in the Medicaid and Medicare context cannot be cured
simply by providing more or better notice and hearing rights. It is
logically impossible to provide adequate notice and hearing for every
treatment decision, which logically includes every decision not to
prescribe care.
I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Medicaid and Medicare programs are a crucial part of our health

care system, providing health care benefits to approximately seventy-five
million Americans, most of whom would otherwise be uninsured. The
* Assistant Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Law Program, Willamette
University College of Law; J.D., Stanford Law School; B.A., Swarthmore College.
The author would like to thank research assistants Sara Cromwell and Tanya Barr
for their good work, Kathy Marbut for logistical help, and Michael Rooke-Ley,
Sylvia Law, Robert Misner, Yvonne Tamayo, Thomas Linder, John Wright and
the entire Willamette College of Law faculty writing group for their support, input
and guidance on earlier drafts of this article.
1. U.S. Health Care Financing Administration [hereinafter HCFA Home
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enormous recent increase in medical costs has caused all providers of
health insurance, including the federal government, to shift more and
more health insurance beneficiaries into managed care plans.2 The
Medicaid and Medicare programs have embraced managed care as a
means of controlling the rapid increases in the costs of these programs.
However, Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries differ from other health
insurance enrollees because the beneficiaries are entitled to procedural
due process rights that are required by the federal Constitution and by
federal statutes and regulations, before their benefits can be terminated,
reduced or denied. 4 The procedural due process rights of Medicaid and
Medicare beneficiaries are not altered by the change to managed-care6
5
based systems.' Medicaid and Medicare are government entitlements.
Due process protections must be provided when an individual's Medicaid
or Medicare benefits are denied, terminated or reduced.7 The detailed
procedural requirements that have developed in state and federal
regulations have their basis in federal constitutional mandates, which
require, at a minimum, effective notice of every denial, reduction or
termination of benefits, and a chance to be heard before an unbiased
decision maker.8
Traditionally, treatment decisions, regarding what medical care is
indicated for an individual, and coverage decisions, regarding whether
Medicaid and/or Medicare will cover such treatment, have been made by

Page], http://www.hcfa.gov/medicare/medicare.htm (visited Mar. 23, 2000).
2. See generally, Jonathan B. Oberlander, Managed Care and Medicare
Reform, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 595 (1997); Lisa Axelrod, Note, The Trend

Toward Medicaid Managed Care: Is the Government Selling Out the Medicaid
Poor?, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 251 (1998); Allen Buchanan, Managed Care:
Rationing Without Justice, But Not Unjustly, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y. & L. 617,
619, 620 (1998).
3. 53.64% of Medicaid beneficiaries were enrolled in managed care as of
1,
at
note
supra
Page,
Home
See
HCFA
1998.
http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/trends98.htm (last visited March 23, 2000). 25.7%
of Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in managed care as of 1999. See Managed
Care On-Line, http://www.medicarehmo.com/mcmnu.htm (last visited July 27,
2000).
4. See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
5. See J.K. v. Dillenberg, 836 F. Supp. 694, 699 (D. Ariz. 1993); see also
Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305, 1310 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).

6. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 n.8.
7. Id. at 261-62; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332.
8. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972).
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different entities. Coverage decisions were made by state Medicaid
agencies, Medicare carriers, or fiscal intermediaries contracting with the
federal government. 9 Due process notice and hearing rights attached to
these decisions.'0 On the other hand, treatment decisions were made by
Medical
medical professionals according to expert judgment.
professionals had no financial incentive to deny needed treatment, but
conversely, had a financial incentive to assist the individual to obtain the
prescribed treatment." Due process rights generally were not triggered
by treatment decisions.
Under managed care, the coverage decision is conflated with the
treatment decision. The entities which previously made Medicaid and
the
initial
decisions
have
delegated
Medicare
coverage
treatment/coverage decision to the managed care organizations and their
care providers through capitated payment systems." The Medicaid or
Medicare entity generally pays the managed care organization a fixed
It is left to the managed care
amount per covered individual."
organization and its medical providers to make the initial determination
about what care will be provided in return for the capitated payment
received." The individual doctor or managed care organization makes
coverage and treatment decisions at the same time." It is no longer
logically possible to distinguish between the coverage decision, which
involves due process rights, and the treatment decision, which
traditionally does not. Therefore, in a managed care context, every
decision made by a doctor as to medical treatment of a Medicaid or
Medicare beneficiary becomes subject to the notice and hearing
requirements required by federal statutes and regulations for coverage

9. 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.702, 405.801, 431.10(c)(2) (1999).
10. Id. §§ 405.702, 405.720, 405.801, 431.205-.206.
11. David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less: Financial
Incentives to Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155, 158 (1996); Pegram v. Herdrich,
__ U.S. __,120 S.Ct. 2143, 2149 (2000).

12. Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305, 1307 (M.D. Tenn. 1996); Grijalva v.
Shalala, 946 F.Supp. 747, 752 (D.Ariz. 1996), affd, 152 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1998),
rev'd and remanded, 119 S. Ct. 1573 (1999), rev'd and remanded, 185 F.3d 1075
(9th Cir. 1999).
13. Kevin Visocan, Recent Changed in Medicare Managed Care: A Step
Backward for Consumers?, 6 ELDER L. J. 31, 33 (1998); Axelrod, supra note 2, at
258-59 (1998); 42 C.F.R. §§ 417.584(a), 434.2.

14. 42 CFR 417.600 (1999); Daniels, 926 F. Supp. at 1308.
15. Pegram,120 S. Ct. at 2154-55.
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decisions.
Reducing or eliminating statutory notice and hearing requirements in
Medicaid and Medicare would not solve the problem because one of the
minimum requirements of constitutional procedural due process is the
right to an unbiased decision maker. 16 Under managed care, the
coverage/treatment decision is made, in the first instance, by individual
doctors and managed care organizations who are subject to direct
financial incentives to deny care.17 The objective validity of the medical
treatment decision and the health insurance coverage decision becomes
deeply suspect in light of these incentives. Therefore, the traditional
reasoning that medical treatment decisions have an objectively reliable
basis and are not subject to the requirements of due process is not
applicable under managed care. In order to provide procedural due
process, Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries need to be given access, in
every coverage/treatment decision, to an unbiased decision maker to
determine whether the care at issue is covered and whether the care is
medically indicated. In a managed care system, this would mean each
beneficiary would be entitled to seek the unbiased opinion of a doctor
who is not subject to a financial incentive to deny care for each
treatment/coverage decision.
When every treatment decision becomes subject to due process
requirements, these requirements apply equally to decisions not to treat.
It is insufficient to provide notice and hearing only when a Medicaid or
Medicare beneficiary requests treatment and when the physician or
managed care organization refuses to provide such treatment. The
decision by the health care provider not to recommend or even mention a
specific treatment deprives the beneficiary of Medicaid or Medicare
coverage for that treatment. Therefore, this decision not to prescribe care
is also subject to the requirements of due process. It is impossible, even in
theory, to provide notice and hearing rights for each decision not to
prescribe a specific treatment, since the set of possible decisions at each
point in time is infinite. Accordingly, it is logically impossible, even if it
were attempted, to provide the due process rights required under the
Fourteenth Amendment in the context of Medicaid and Medicare
managed care.
To provide Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries with due process
without running into the wall of logical impossibility, treatment and
coverage decisions in Medicaid and Medicare again must be separated.
16. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 578-81 (1975); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494-95 (1985).
17. Daniels,926 F. Supp. at 1313.
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Treatment decisions must be made by doctors who do not make the
coverage decision and who are not subject to systematic bias to deny
necessary health care. In order to comply with the demands of the
Constitution, managed care, as it currently exists, can no longer be a part
of Medicaid or Medicare.
First, the basic structure of the Medicaid and Medicare programs is
briefly discussed. Second, the traditional due process analysis in these
programs, and the constitutional, statutory notice, and hearing
requirements for each program are examined. Third, the types of health
care decisions that are subject to due process requirements are analyzed
through examination of the leading cases in both the Medicaid and
Medicare contexts. Fourth, the effect of third party involvement,
including Medicaid and Medicare managed care organizations (MCOs), in
the decision-making process is addressed. Included in this discussion is an
analysis of the question of when state action is found and when an
entitlement arises.
Fifth, the nature of the medical treatment decision and the health care
coverage decision is examined, as is, the conflation of the two decisions in
Medicaid and Medicare managed care. Sixth, the minimum requirement
of constitutional due process, that decisions be made by an unbiased
decision maker, and the effect of managed care in creating systematic
incentives for the decision maker to deny both care and coverage are then
discussed. Finally, the significance, in due process terms, of each decision
not to provide medical treatment, and the logical impossibility of
providing notice and hearing rights in every instance of non-treatment are
noted. The article concludes that it is impossible to comply with the
requirements of constitutional due process under current Medicaid and
Medicare managed care systems.

140

II.
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BACKGROUND: THE MEDICAID AND MEDICARE PROGRAMS 8

Together the Medicaid and Medicare programs provide health
insurance coverage to approximately seventy-five million individuals. 19
These two programs alone make the federal government by far the largest
single health insurer in the country.20
A.

Medicaid

The Medicaid program is the insurer of last resort for very low-income
elderly and disabled individuals, children and their families. The program
is funded and administered jointly by the federal. government and by
states that choose to participate."1 Until 1997, state Medicaid programs
generally were not permitted to limit Medicaid recipients in their choice
of doctors, unless they received a specific waiver of this requirement from
the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA).22 States may now
require Medicaid recipients who also are not eligible for Medicare to
enroll in managed care organizations (MCOs). 23 Over the past tenyears,
more and more Medicaid recipients have been moved into managed
24
care.
The state agency makes the eligibility determination in traditional
18. Only a brief overview of these programs is provided here to give the
needed background for the discussion of the due process issues which arise in a
context of managed care. For a more complete description and analysis of the
Medicare program, see Joe Baker, Medicare Nuts and Bolts, 263 PRACTICING L.
INST. 65 (1998); Timothy Jost, GoverningMedicare, 51 ADMIN. L. R. 39 (1999); PiYi Mayo, Medicare Health Maintenance Organizations, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 25
(1997); Visocan, supra note 13, at 31. For an in-depth look at the Medicaid
program see Barbara J. Collins, Medicaid1998, 263 PRACTICING L. INST. 37; David

Liska, Medicaid: Overview of a Complex Program, "Assessing New Federalism:
Issues and Options for States" issue No. A-8, Urban Institute (1999).

at
1,
note
Page,
supra
Home
19. HFCA
23,
2000).
(last
visited
Mar.
http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/medicaid.htm
20. The federal government provides health insurance through other
programs as well, including the Veterans' Administration health care system, the
Indian Health Service and the federal employees' health insurance program. See
Health Care Financing Administration, Highlights, National Health Expenditures,

1998, http://www.hcfa.gov/stats/nhe-oact/hilites.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2000).
21. All fifty states participate in the Medicaid program.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(23) (1995); 42 C.F.R. § 431.51 (1999).
23. Axelrod, supra note 2, at 256.
24. 53.64% of Medicaid beneficiaries were enrolled in managed care as of
1,
at
note
supra
Home
Page,
HCFA
See
1998.
http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/trends98.htm.
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Medicaid programs. Denials of Medicaid eligibility entitle applicants to a
fair hearing before a decision maker who was not directly involved in the
original eligibility determination."
At this hearing, the individual is
entitled to see all the documentary evidence in the state agency's
possession.26 The individual is entitled to present and cross-examine
witnesses and may be represented by an attorney or assisted by a nonattorney spokesperson.2 7 The hearing officer's decision must be both in
writing and based solely on the record. 28 If the hearing decision is
29
unfavorable, the individual may appeal to state court. In addition, if the
state rules, statutes, and/or procedures upon which a denial is based
violate federal Medicaid law, the individual may sue in federal district
court under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, for deprivation of rights provided by
federal law.3°
If, instead of the denial of an application for Medicaid benefits, there is
a termination or reduction of Medicaid benefits, federal
law requires that
• 31
notice be given prior to the termination or reduction.
If the Medicaid
recipient requests a fair hearing, the Medicaid benefits must generally be
32
continued until the hearing decision is rendered.
B.

Medicare

Medicare provides health insurance benefits to persons sixty-five years
of age and older who are entitled to receive Social Security retirement
benefits and to persons who have been entitled to Social Security
disability insurance benefits for at least two years.33 Medicare is a strictly

25. This decision maker may be an employee of the state Medicaid agency.
See 42 C.F.R. § 431.233.
26. Id. § 431.242(a).
27. Id. § 431.206(b)(3).
28. Id. §§ 431.244(a),(d) (1999).
29. Eleanor D. Kinney, The Role of JudiciaryReview Regarding Medicare and
Medicaid ProgramPolicy: Past Experience and Future Expectations, 35 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 759, 765 (1991).
30. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508-09 (1990); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
31. 42 C.F.R. § 431.211; Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262.
32. If there is no factual issue to be resolved at the hearing, and the only issue
to be decided is one of federal or state law or policy, then Medicaid benefits may
be terminated or reduced prior to the hearing. 42 C.F.R. § 431.230.
33. Medicare also provides coverage to some other groups, including persons
eligible for Railroad Retirement benefits, federal civil service retirees, and certain
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federal program, administered by contract through private insurance
34
providers, without regulation or involvement by the states. There are
three distinct parts to Medicare (A, B & C), with different procedures and
regulations governing, each. 5 Under each part, Medicare
covers only
36
treatment that is medically "reasonable and necessary.,
Medicare Parts A and B are administered by private insurance
companies (frequently, Blue Cross/Blue Shield insurance companies)
under contract with HCFA.37 These private contractors handle all
administrative matters, make initial coverage decisions, send notices, and
issue reimbursements
in accordance with highly detailed federal
• 38
regulations. They also conduct the initial stages of appeal for denial of
benefits. 39 Subsequent appeal procedures may include the right to an
Administrative Law Judge hearing, review by the Social Security Appeals
Council, and federal district court review, depending on the amount in
controversy.40

Under traditional Medicare, payment for medical care is generally
made on a retrospective basis. 4' This means the care is provided before
Medicare determines whether to cover the care. The retrospective
compensation system means that either the patient or the provider must
bear the risk that the medical care will not be covered. This risk may
result in some needed care effectively being denied without the question
of coverage ever being addressed within the Medicare system itself.
Since 1982, Medicare beneficiaries have had the option of enrolling in a
Medicare Health Maintenance Organization (HMO).4 2
Enrollees
generally agree to receive treatment from providers who participate in the
HMO, and to select a primary care physician to act as "gatekeeper" for all
referrals for testing and treatment by specialized providers.4 ' Historically,
enrollees have been free to enroll and disenroll in Medicare HMOs on a
monthly basis. 44 Beginning in 2001, enrollees who chose managed care
naturalized citizens or lawful permanent residents. 42 U.S.C. 426 (1995).
34. Joe Baker, Medicare Nuts and Bolts, 263 PLI/Est 65, 68 (1998).
35. Id. at 68
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x, 1395y(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 2000).
37. Baker, supra note 34, at 70.
38. Id. at 70; see generally 42 C.F.R. §§ 400-24 (1999).
39. 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.702-405.717,405.801-405.812,405.821-405.850.
40. Id. §§ 405.720-405.730, 405.815, 405.855-405.857.
41. Id. § 424.34.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(mm) (Supp. 2000).
43. Visocan, supra note 13, at 35.
44. 42 C.F.R. § 406.21 (1999); see also id. §§ 407.12-.15.
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will have a limited open enrollment period and will only be entitled to
change their Medicare HMO plan once per year."
In 1997, the Medicare program was expanded to include Medicare Part
C, also called Medicare + Choice.46 Under Part C, Medicare beneficiaries
can chose among Medicare HMOs, and various other managed care
organizational forms. 47

III. BASIC DUE PROCESS IN MEDICAID AND MEDICARE
A.

Due process and entitlements

The United States Supreme Court has long held that when an
individual is deprived of liberty or property by the state, "due process
requires that there be a regular course of judicial proceedings, which
imply that the party affected shall have notice and an opportunity to be
heard..."48 Early procedural due process cases dealt with situations
where the state incarcerated an individual or deprived the individual of
tangible property.49 In the last thirty years, the courts have extended due
process protections • to liberty or
property interests created under
50
government entitlement programs. If the government statutorily creates
an entitlement, procedural due process protections must apply,5 even
where an individual would not otherwise have a constitutional right to a
particular benefit. A benefit is an entitlement when an individual who
meets specific eligibility criteria is entitled by statute to receive that

45. Id. § 422.62.
46. Jennifer E. Gladieux, Medicare+ChoiceAppeal Procedures:Reconciling
Due ProcessRights and Cost Containment, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 61, 61 (1999).
47. Id. at 61-62.
48. Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884); see U.S. CONST.
amend. V, XIV.
49. Mullane v. Cen. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (notice
to beneficiaries of a trust fund); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)
(prejudgment garnishment of wages); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)
(repossession of goods); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (criminal
proceeding); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (criminal proceeding).
50. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
51. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 86; see generally Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-73 (1975); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S.
593, 601 (1972); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Logan v.
Zimmerman Bruch Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982); Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115,
128 (1985).
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144

benefit."2
In cases in which the extension or deprivation of an entitlement
depends on a medical determination, that medical determination is not
exempt from the notice and hearing provisions of the due process
clauses.53

B.

TraditionalMedicaid and MedicareDue ProcessAnalysis

Exactly what procedures due process requires is a practical question,
varying greatly from situation to situation. The determination focuses
on: 1) the nature of the right or interest of which the individual is being
deprived; 2) the risk of error in the determination of ineligibility; 3) the
cost to the individual and to society of such error; and 4) the cost to the
government in providing additional procedural protections.5 On several
occasions, the Supreme Court has set out the basic minimum procedural
56
At a minimum, due
protections generally required by due process.
process requires notice of the deprivation of the right or interest and an
opportunity to be heard. A formal hearing may or may not be required,
but in order to be effective, the right to be heard must include the right to
examine the evidence relied upon in making the decision, the right to
present contrary evidence, and the right to an impartial and unbiased
decision maker. 7
In determining the nature of the hearing constitutionally required in a
given situation, courts have addressed the question of whether the hearing
should be held before or after the individual is deprived of the entitlement

52. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262.
53. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1985). "We recognize that the
inquiry ... involves a question that is essentially medical ... The medical nature
of the inquiry, however, does not justify dispensing with due process
requirements. It is precisely '[t]he subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnoses'
that justify the requirement of adversary hearings." Id. (quoting Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979)). See generally West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
54. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Morrisey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
55. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 336.
56. Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246 (1944); see also
Mullane v. Cen. Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 80 (1972); Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481-84; Goss, 419
U.S. at 579; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333.
57. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 80 (1972); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578-81
(1975); Vitek, 445 U.S. at 494-95.
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interest." Generally, there must be some opportunity to be heard before
a final deprivation of liberty or property occurs. 9 However, under many
circumstances, an initial action can be taken or an initial determination6
to be heard. 0
can be made before the individual receives the opportunity
In each case, the cost to the individual of a possibly erroneous deprivation
before a hearing must be weighed against the cost to the state or federal
government of providing a pre-termination hearing. The more essential
the liberty or property interest is to the individual's survival and wellbeing, and the more likely that even a temporary deprivation of that
interest will result in irremediable harm to the individual, the more prone
61
the courts are to require a pre-termination hearing.
The requirements of due process in the context of Medicaid and
Medicare benefits were established in two pivotal Supreme Court cases:6
6
v. Eldridge 1
Goldberg v. Kelly 2 (Medicaid) in 1970, and Mathews
(Medicare) in 1976. Goldberg focuses on the procedural protections
required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in the specific context
of welfare benefits. 4 The Mathews Court begins with an analytical
framework for determining the procedures required by due process in any
given context and then applies this framework to determine the obligatory
65
procedural protections in the context of Title II Social Security benefits.

58. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976).
59. Parrat v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540-41 (1981); see generally Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
60. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594, 598 (1950).
61. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-93 (1985); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 26465; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
62. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
63. 424 U.S. 319 (1970).
64. The Goldberg case dealt with notice and hearing rights in the context of
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits. 397 U.S. 254. The
Court held that the Goldberg due process requirements applied to "welfare" or
"public assistance" benefits. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341, 343. Medicaid has
traditionally been considered a part of the "welfare" benefits provided to indigent
individuals by state and federal governments. Therefore, the due process analysis
of Goldberg in the AFDC context has been applied to Medicaid benefits as well.
Congress incorporated the Goldberg requirements into the Medicaid statute. 42
U.S.C. § 1386a(a)(3) (1995); 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.200, 431.205(d) (1999). Courts have
held that the Goldbergconstitutional requirements apply in the Medicaid context.
See Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305, 1312 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
65. Mathews dealt with notice and hearing rights in Title II disability benefits.
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1.

Medicaid Notice and Hearing Rights - Goldberg

Medicaid benefits are statutory entitlements, requiring procedural due
process prior to termination. 66 The Goldberg Court examined what kind
of hearing must be provided in the context of welfare benefits, and
whether an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of such benefits was
constitutionally required. The Court noted that "welfare provides the
means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care...,"
and "that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over
eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to
live while he waits." 67 The Court further found that the government has
an interest in the uninterrupted provision of these benefits to eligible
individuals and that pre-termination hearings would reduce the risk of
erroneous termination. 68 The interest of the welfare recipient together
with the interest of the government in avoiding erroneous termination
was held to outweigh the government's interest in reducing administrative
costs by deferring the hearing until after benefits are terminated. 69
The Court quoted with approval the district court's weighing of the
relevant costs and benefits of pre-termination hearings. 7' The Court
stated that the termination of benefits essential to an individual's daily
These are cash benefits accruing to individuals who have the requisite work
history and who meet Social Security disability criteria. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at
332-49. Unlike the AFDC or Medicaid benefits, income or other financial
resources of the Title II beneficiary are irrelevant in determining eligibility for
Title II disability benefits. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.701 et seq. While some Medicare
beneficiaries qualify based on their eligibility for Title I disability benefits, the
majority of beneficiaries qualify based on eligibility for Title II retirement
benefits. See id. § 405.801 et seq. The due process requirements of Title II
disability benefits defined in Mathews have been applied to Medicare benefits in
the Medicare statute and regulations, and by the courts. See Grijalva v. Shalala,
946 F.Supp. 747, 752 (D. Ariz. 1996), affd, 152 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd
and remanded, 119 S.Ct. 1573 (1999), rev'd and remanded, 185 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir.
1999).
66. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263. "Such benefits are a matter of statutory
entitlement for persons qualified to receive them." Id.
67. Id. at 265.
68. Id. at 264-65.
69. Id. at 265-267.
70. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970).
To cut off a welfare recipient in the face of... 'brutal need' without a
prior hearing of some sort is unconscionable unless overwhelming
considerations justify it ....Against the justified desire to protect public
funds must be weighed the individual's overpowering need in this unique
situation not to be wrongfully deprived of assistance. Id.
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existence would throw him or her into a crisis situation that would make it
very difficult for the person to pursue effectively his or her procedural
rights.7' The Court also adopted the district court's conclusion that "[t]he
stakes are simply too high for the welfare recipient, and the possibility for
honest error or irritable misjudgment too great, 72 to allow pre-hearing
termination of benefits.
Before termination of welfare (including Medicaid) benefits, timely and
detailed notice must be given specifying the reasons for termination.
Prior to termination, the beneficiary has the right to an in-person
hearing.74 The hearing includes: the opportunity to present evidence,
confront and cross-examine witnesses; the right to be represented by
counsel at the hearing;71 the right to have the decision based solely on the
hearing record; 77 the right to have a written hearing decision indicating the
reasons for the decision and the evidence relied upon;78 and the right to an
impartial decision maker.79
2.

MedicareNotice and HearingRights - Mathews

Title II disability benefits (and, by extension, Medicare benefits) are
also entitlements to which the requirements of procedural due process
apply."' The Court established a three-part analysis to •determine
•
•
81the
procedural protections required by due process in any given situation.

71. Id. at 264.
72. Id. at 266.
73. Id. at 268-69.
74. Id. at 269-70.
75. Id. at 269-71 (citing ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88,
93-94 (1913)); see also Willner v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 10304 (1963); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959).
76. Goldberg,397 U.S. at 271-72 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69
(1932)).
77. Id. at 272 (citing Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. PUC, 301 U.S. 292 (1937)); United
States v. Abilene & S.R. Co., 265 U.S. 274, 288-89 (1924).
78. Id. (citing Wichita R. & Light Co. v. PUC, 260 U.S. 48, 57-59 (1922)).
79. Id. at 272. "And, of course, an impartial decision maker is essential." Id.
(citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955)) (emphasis added); Wong Yang Sung
v.McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 45-46 (1950).
80. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). "[T]he interest of an
individual in continued receipt of these benefits is a statutorily created 'property'
interest protected by the Fifth Amendment." Id.
81. Id. at 334-35 (citing Goldberg,397 U.S. at 263-71).
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First, courts must consider the nature of the private interest at stake
and its importance to the individual concerned." Second, they must
examine the risk that the procedures used by the government will
erroneously deprive the individual of the interest at issue.83 Included in
this step is a consideration of how efficacious additional procedural
protections would be in reducing such error.84 Courts must evaluate the
government's interest in a more streamlined procedure, including the
interest in reducing administrative costs."
The Court in Mathews held that Title .IIdisability benefits are
sufficiently different from the welfare benefits at issue in Goldberg.
Therefore, due process does not require the government to grant a
hearing to disability benefit recipients prior to termination." The Court
concluded that benefits which are not based on financial need are less
crucial to the survival and well-being of the recipient. 87 The Mathews
Court noted that recipients whose benefits were erroneously terminated
were entitled to receive retroactive benefits after winning a post88
termination hearing.
The Court concluded that the risk of erroneously denying benefits was
reduced when eligibility determinations depended largely on "routine,
standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician specialists., 89 Such a
determination, according to the Mathews Court, presented a "more
sharply focussed and easily documented decision than the typical
determination of welfare entitlement," and therefore "[t]he potential
value of an evidentiary hearing, or even oral presentation to the decision
maker, is substantially less in this context."' Finally, the court concluded
that the potential cost of pre-termination hearings "would not be
insubstantial." 91
The Mathews opinion did not address the other specific procedural
requirements for notice and hearing stated in Goldberg, but explicitly
limited its consideration to the question of whether an evidentiary hearing

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 335.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mathews, 424 U.S. 340-43.
Id. at 341-43.
Id. at 340.
Id. at 345 (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 344-346.
Id. at 348.
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must be held prior to the termination of benefits.
The other
requirements of Goldberg were already embodied in the Medicare rules
at issue in Mathews.93
C.

Due process in Medicaid and Medicare Managed Care

When Medicaid or Medicare beneficiaries enroll in a MCO, they
remain entitled to the same range of health insurance as those

beneficiaries in a fee-for-service arrangement.94 The MCO (or its
employee or contracting healthcare provider) makes the initial decision
regarding coverage of a particular medical service, based on Medicaid or
Medicare regulations. 5 These federal regulations make reference to
medical standards;96 however, MCOs must refer to and comply with not
only these
• 97medical standards, but also with the relevant government

regulations.
Accordingly, the "medical" component of the coverage
decision (e.g, whether a given treatment is "medically reasonable and
necessary") is the same in the MCO context as it is in the traditional feefor-service arrangement. However, with the advent of managed care,
initial responsibility for the coverage decision previously made by a
Medicaid agency or Medicare carrier or intermediary has been transferred

92. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334.
93. 42 C.F.R. § 405.830 (1999); 42 U.S.C. 1395ff(b) (1995); Mathews, 424 U.S.
at 336-40.
94. 42 C.F.R. §§ 434.20(c)(2); § 417.414(b) (Medicaid and Medicare HMOs
must provide beneficiaries all the coverage to which they are entitled). MCOs
may opt to offer more expansive benefits than available in traditional
Medicaid/Medicare. See id.
95. Id. § 405.702 (stating that the States "intermediary" makes initial
determination regarding coverage.).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) ("No payment may be made.., for any
expenses incurred for items or services which.., are not reasonable and necessary
for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury.").
97. Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd and
remanded, 119 S. Ct. 1573 (1999), rev'd and remanded, 185 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir.
1999). "HMOs are following congressional and regulatory orders and are making
decisions as a governmental proxy - they are deciding that Medicare does not
cover certain medical services." Id.; see also, Timothy P. Blanchard, "Medical
Necessity" Denials as a Medicare Part B Cost-Containment Strategy: Two Wrongs
Don't Make It Right or Rational, 34 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 939, 973 (1990). "Whether a
particular service is reasonable is a policy question not unlike those Congress is
presented with every year." Id.
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from the government entity to the MCO.98
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BOTTOM LINE: DUE PROCESS
REQUIREMENTS IN MEDICAID AND MEDICARE MANAGED CARE

A.

When Does Due ProcessApply?

1. Strictly medical treatmentdecisions are not subject to due
processprotections - Blum v. Yaretsky
Physicians and other medical providers make many decisions about
individual patients' medical treatment. While a patient may desire a
second opinion, the doctor's decision regarding appropriate medical care
in a given situation has not traditionally been seen as a decision requiring
procedural protections of notice and hearing. However, when the medical
providers' decision regarding medical treatment results in the termination
or reduction of publicly-financed health insurance benefits, the issue of
whether and when such a decision implicates due process arises. In Blum
v. Yaretsky,99 the Supreme Court addressed this issue in the context of
Medicaid.
At issue in Blum was a state created system under which doctors and
nursing homes were required to determine, using state-mandated forms
and procedures, the appropriate state-defined level of care for nursing
home patients.'m When a doctor or nursing home determined that a
patient's needs fell into a lower category of care, the state Medicaid
regulations required the nursing home to "make all efforts possible"'' 1 to
transfer the patient to a facility providing the lower level of care. Upon
such transfer, the state would automatically terminate payments to the
nursing home. 02 In addition, nursing homes were inspected periodically

98. See Gordon Bonneyman, Due Process and Grievance Procedures in
Publicly FinancedManaged Care, in BALANCING THE SYSTEM: CONSUMER RIGHTS
IN MANAGED CARE 3 (June 20, 1997).
Managed care organizations frequently deny, reduce or terminate
services prescribed by providers, as the Medicaid agency itself seldom or
never did in the days of fee-for-service. By creating a managed care
program and delegating management of patient care to MCOs, the state
interposes its agent (the MCO) between the consumer and the provider.

Id.
99. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
100. Id. at 994-95.
101. Id. at 1007 (quoting 10 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. TIT. 10, §§
416.9(d)(1), 421.13(d)(1) (1980)).
102. Id. at 995.
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by the state Medicaid agency to determine whether
they were complying
S• 103
with state regulations regarding transfer of patients.
Failure to comply
with state regulations resulted in penalties imposed on the nursing home
by the state. '°4
In Blum, nursing home patients argued that the doctor's or nursing
home's determination that a patient needed a lower category of care was
equivalent to a decision to terminate Medicaid payments for the current
nursing home placement, and that therefore patients were entitled to due
process in that determination.' 5 The patients also argued that they should
receive notice of the determination to transfer them to a lower level of
care, should be informed of the reasons for the decision, and should have
the opportunity to present evidence and argument that the determination
was in error.' °6 The Court held that patients were not entitled to such
notice and hearing rights because the decision to transfer patients to a
lower level of care was a purely private decision by the medical care
providers based on purely medical criteria, which did not amount to state
action. If no state action is involved, due process rights do not apply.
Blum turns upon the notion that the treatment decision, made
according to medical principles by the medical provider, remains distinct
from the coverage decision made according to Medicaid statutes and
regulations by the state agency. Only the latter decision is entitled to the
protections of due process.'0 In asserting the independence of these two
decisions, the Court noted that the state exerted no coercive power in the
decision making process in any individual case.1 ° The medical providers
making the level-of-care determination in a given case were not subject to
state-created incentives to deny care."
However, as the Court's own

103. Id. at 1009 n.21.
104. Id. at 1009-10.
105. Blum, 457 U.S. at 996.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1005.
108. Id. at 1002-03.
109. See generally id. at 991.
110. Id. at 1004-05.
111. Id. at 1005 (1982). "There is no suggestion that those decisions were
influenced in any degree by the State's obligation to adjust benefits in conformity
with changes in the cost of medically necessary care." Id. The merging of the
treatment decision and the coverage decision in Blum subjected the decision to
the requirements of due process. The lack of decision maker bias is relevant to
what kind of process is due, not to whether due process is required. Under the
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analysis makes clear, once the treatment decision had been made in these
cases, there was no coverage decision left for the state to make."' A
coverage standard for eligibility for benefits was defined by the state, and
doctors were required to make the determination as to whether or not
individuals met that standard. "3
That determination was then
characterized as a purely medical treatment decision, immune from the
requirements of due process."'

However, as the dissent in Blum argues," 5 the decisions made by the
doctors and nursing homes in cases involving medical eligibility clearly are
not purely medical treatment decisions, entirely divorced from Medicaid

coverage issues. The medical providers' • decisions
cannot be made
116
without reference to Medicaid eligibility rules. In fact, the decisions are
based on categories of care which are created and defined solely by
Medicaid eligibility rules."' Such care levels are not diagnostic terms used
by medical professionals outside of the Medicaid and Medicare contexts.
Rather, the level-of-care decision necessarily involves the interpretation
of Medicaid program requirements, and therefore involves the application

of standards created and defined by the government.'

8

Under the Blum

analysis, by merging treatment and coverage decisions, and placing them
in the hands of private actors, all due process requirements imposed by
the Constitution, statutes and regulations on the coverage decisions no

facts in Blum, a notice and hearing process could pass constitutional muster
without necessarily requiring access to a different decision maker, which would
not be the case in the managed care context.
112. Id. at 1010. "Nothing in the regulations authorizes the officials to
approve or disapprove decisions either to retain or discharge particular
patients.., the State is obliged to approve or disapprove continued payment of
Medicaid benefits after a change in the patient's need for services." Id.
113. Id. at 1005-1006.
114. Id. at 1007-09.
115. Id. at 1016-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
With respect to patients whose expenses are not reimbursed through
Medicaid, these attempts to assign the patient to one of two mutually
exclusive 'levels of care' would be anomalous. While the criteria used ...
obviously have a medical nexus, those criteria are not geared to the
specific needs of particular residents as determined by a physician. Id.
116. Id. at 1016-17.
117. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1015.
118. Pegram v. Herdrich, _ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 2143, 2154 (2000).

"In

practical terms, these eligibility decisions cannot be untangled from physicians'
judgments about reasonable medical treatment .... The eligibility decision and
the treatment decision [are] inextricably mixed." Id.
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longer apply.
The Court erred in Blum because it assumed that once the decision at
issue was identified as a treatment decision, the due process inquiry was
over. The Court based this assumption on the traditional rule that
treatment decisions are exempt from due process requirements for lack of
state action. It failed to acknowledge the reality that, in the Blum context,
the treatment decision had been merged with the coverage decision.
Coverage decisions remain subject to the requirements of due process,
even when they are intertwined with treatment decisions. The decisions
in Blum are a hybrid, involving both Medicaid eligibility questions and
questions of medical diagnosis. In other cases where important liberty
rights turn on difficult questions of medical diagnosis, the Court has held
that due process requirements still apply.'19 The fact that a decision turns
in part on professional expertise does not in itself immunize the decision
from the demands of due process. A decision as to how an individual
patient fits into eligibility categories created by a government entitlement
program can never be a purely medical treatment decision.

2. Due process in Medicaid Benefits Provided Through
Private Entities
If medical decisions that result in reduction or termination of
entitlement benefits may be subject to due process requirements, what of
decisions by private entities that contract with the goyernment to provide
entitlement benefits? The Fifth and Fourteenth amendments apply only
to governmental entities or state actors.
Therefore, the question
becomes whether due process requirements are included in the package
when medical entitlements programs are turned over to managed care
organizations.

119. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1985) (citing Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 430 (1979)).
"We recognize that the inquiry involved in determining whether or not to
transfer an inmate to a mental hospital for treatment involves a question
that is essentially medical ....

The medical nature of the inquiry,

however, does not justify dispensing with due process requirements. It is
precisely '[t]he subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnoses' that
justify the requirement of adversary hearings." Id.
120. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Adickes v. Kress, 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Blum v. Yaretsky,

457 U.S. 991, 1002-03 (1982).
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This issue was first addressed in J.K. v. Dillenberg."2 In this case, the
entities to provide mental health services to
state contracted
122
/ r. with
• • private
These entities were created and existed only to
Medicaid beneficiaries.
The state had
provide Medicaid-covered mental health services.
entirely delegated its authority over these particular Medicaid-covered
services to the private entities.14 These private entities established time
limits on mental health treatment provided and covered under the state
Medicaid program."' When these time periods for covered treatment
ended, treatment
• was
•
126terminated without notice or hearing to the
-beneficiaries.
Medicaid
The state and the private entities argued that the decision as to the
length of
127 treatment was purely a private action, not subject to due
However, the federal district court correctly determined that
process.
the decision was a Medicaid coverage decision, which required due
process protection.8 The court focused on the fact that the state had
delegated entirely its Medicaid coverage decisions to the private entity,
and that the private entity served as an agent of the state."' The court
was emphatic in its decision that the state could not evade due process
requirements by turning over its decisions to a private entity. 3 Because
Medicaid coverage for a beneficiary's treatment was determined entirely
by the decision regarding the length of treatment, this decision was
subject to due process notice and hearing requirements.
In this situation, the "treatment" decision was not based on
individualized expert assessment of the medical needs of the Medicaid
beneficiary, but was based on a general policy determination of how much
121. 836 F. Supp. 694 (D. Ariz. 1993). This case has been extremely
influential in other courts' decisions as to whether due process protections apply
to decisions made by medical providers to whom the state has delegated the

responsibility for determining Medicaid and Medicare coverage. It is cited in
nearly every case discussed below.
122. Id. at 697.
123. Id. at 698.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 697.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 697-99.
128. Id. at 700.
129. Id. 698-99.
130. Id. at 699. "It is patently unreasonable to presume that Congress would
permit a state to disclaim federal responsibilities by contracting away its
obligations to a private entity." Id.
131. Id. at 698-700.
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care would be provided to Medicaid beneficiaries as a group. Thus, the
determination more closely resembled a pure coverage decision than the
decisions at issue in Blum. The court explained that "certain duties are
non-delegable" ' as a matter of law. Medicaid coverage decisions, even
when delegated to private parties, remain the responsibility of the
delegating agency.' The attendant due process requirements follow the
coverage decision, regardless of what entity actually makes the decision.
134
Similarly, in Catanzano v. Dowling, the state delegated the decision
whether to provide Medicaid-covered home health care to home health
care agencies.'35 The agencies were required to review the home health
care prescription of the treating physicians in order to determine whether
or not the care was medically necessary and whether the home care was
cost effective.
Again, the state and the home health care agencies
argued that the agencies were merely "private entities that make only
independent professional judgments regarding the care that each patient
requires and therefore that no fair hearing rights are triggered by their
determinations.', 3 7 The court focused on the fact that the determinations
made by the home health agencies were not based on "independent
professional
judgment," but on Medicaid standards, statutes and
• 138
regulations. The home health agencies' analysis of the cost effectiveness
of treatment (not part of traditional medical treatment decision making,
nor within medical providers' field of professional expertise) clearly
indicated that the decision being made was not purely a treatment
decision, but was also a Medicaid coverage decision.
The first (and so far, the only) case addressing the issue of the
interconnection of Medicaid treatment and coverage decisions in the
context of Medicaid managed care is Daniels v. Wadley."9 Here, the state
132. Id. at 699.
133. Id. at 698; Grijafka v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1121 (1998), rev'd and
remanded 119 S. Ct. 1573 (1990), rev'd and remanded, 185 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir.
1999).

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

60 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 119.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 119.
926 F. Supp. 1305 (M.D. Tenn. 1996), vacated in part by Daniels v.

Menke, 145 F.3d 1330 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that lower court could have
reached the same result without having to reach the issue of state action and

vacating constitution decision on grounds of judicial economy).
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contracted with MCOs to provide covered treatment to Medicaid
beneficiaries. 4 0 The court found that the MCOs had taken on the role of
the state in determining Medicaid coverage, and that therefore the MCO
141
determinations were subject to the requirements of due process.
The MCO determinations failed to meet these due process
requirements in two respects: 1) the lack of pre-termination notice and
hearing rights, and, more importantly, 2) the lack of an unbiased decision
The MCOs' determinations as to whether care was covered by
maker.
Medicaid were inherently violative of due process because "Managed
Care Organizations ('MCOs') have financial incentives to deny enrollees
health care even when such health care is medically appropriate."'' 43 Such
decision-making violates the beneficiaries' rights because due process
cannot be provided by a decision maker who has "a 'direct, personal,
substantial pecuniary interest' in the ruling against one party in the action.
In the current action the MCOs have a direct and substantial pecuniary
interest in denying or delaying costly services for which the MCOs must
In order to comply with due process requirements, the
pay. ' 44
beneficiary must be provided with a termination notice and MCO
coverage/treatment determinations must be appealable to an unbiased
decision maker.
These cases indicate that due process requirements apply to
treatment/coverage determinations made by Medicaid MCOs. The same
notice and hearing rights outlined in federal regulations for traditional
Medicaid must be provided in Medicaid managed care. The crucial
question is whether it is possible, even in theory, for managed care to
provide these due process rights in every decision in which they are
constitutionally required.
3.
Due process in Medicare Benefits Provided Through
Private Entities
The first case to address Medicare due process rights in situations
where coverage decisions are made by entities other than Medicare

140. Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. at 1307
141. Id. at 1311-12. This portion of the opinion was vacated by the
subsequent holding. See Daniels v. Menke, 145 F.3d 1330 (6th Cir. 1998).
142. Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. at 1312-13. This portion of the opinion
was vacated by the subsequent holding. Daniels v. Menke, 145 F.3d 1330 (6th Cir.
1998).
143. Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. at 1307.
144. Id. at 1313.
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carriers or intermediaries was Kraemer v. Heckler.14' Kraemer dealt with
hospital and nursing home Utilization Review Committees' (URCs')
decisions to discharge Medicare beneficiaries from care. 4 The Medicare
statute required hospitals and nursing homes to create URCs to
periodically review the medical necessity of care for each beneficiary. 47 A
URC's decision that care was no longer medically necessary, terminating
Medicare coverage, generally was binding upon the Medicare fiscal
intermediary, while a decision to continue coverage was subject to
However, beneficiaries
independent review by the Medicare entity.
nor an opportunity
process
decision
of
the
URC
received neither notice

to present evidence or arguments during the process.149
The Second Circuit reversed the lower court's summary judgment
decision that URC decisions are not subject to due process. The court
noted the extent to which URC procedures and standards are defined by
URC decisions look more like
the Medicare statute and regulations.'
statutes, regulations and
on
Medicare
Medicare coverage decisions, based
policies, than like medical treatment decisions made according to
objective medical standards. The court also noted the incentives placed
on medical providers in the URC process to deny Medicare coverage."'
Next, the court applied the Mathews due process test to the procedures

145. 737 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1984).
146. Id. at 216.
147. Id.

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 218-19. A determination as to the applicability of due process to
URC decisions was specifically reserved in Blum, because a consent decree
entered into by the parties with regard to such decisions had settled that issue in
the case. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1007 n.17 (1982).
151. Kraemer v. Heckler, 737 F.2d 214, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1984).
152. Id. at 220.
153. Id. at 221-22. Medicare rules, known as "waiver of liability" rules,
provide that if more than 5% (for nursing homes) or 2.5% (for hospitals) of a
medical provider's URC decisions to continue Medicare coverage are ultimately
reversed, the provider becomes financially responsible for all care provided which
proves to be not covered by Medicare. If the error rate of the URC is below the
applicable threshold, Medicare pays for the care provided in error by the medical
provider. Erroneous decisions to terminate Medicare coverage are generally not
figured into the error rate. Thus, the URC is under a direct incentive to deny
Medicare coverage in any case where eligibility is not obvious.
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at issue in the case. 15' The court indicated that when the benefits at issue
may determine the ability of the beneficiary to obtain needed medical
treatment, the private interests are far greater than the disability benefits
interest in Mathews.155 Because of the extremely high cost of medical
care, denial of coverage will frequently mean denial of access to care. 151
The court further doubted that URC coverage decisions based on
Medicare statutes, regulations and policies provided the degree of fairness
15 7
and reliability in the initial decision making process found in Mathews.
Finally, the court found that the complete absence of notice, explanation
and the chance to be heard in the URC process clearly distinguished the
case from the situation in Mathews, such that a pre-termination notice and
right to be heard might be applicable.
This possibility was adopted several years later in Grijalva v. Shalala.
Grijalva was the first case to address directly the issue of due process
requirements in the context of Medicare managed care. Both the federal
district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Medicare
HMO coverage decisions are subject to constitutional due process
requirements.'6 The district court pointed out that "[i]n risk based
managed care, the HMO performs two functions: direct provider of
medical care and insurer. In the fee-for-service system, separate entities
perform these functions: medical providers, i.e., doctors, and insurance
companies. This case questions the performance of the latter function by
private provider HMOs.' 16' The Ninth Circuit agreed that the crucial
issue which distinguished Grijalva from the Blum case was that "[t]he
decisions in the case at hand are more accurately described as coverage
decisions - interpretations of the Medicare statute - rather than merely
medical judgments. '1 6 2 In other words, when private entities make
decisions which determine Medicare coverage, they are subject to the
requirements of due process, even though such requirements would not
apply to purely medical treatmentdecisions made by the same entities.

154. Id. at 222.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Kraemer, 737 F.2d at 222.
158. Id.

159. Grijalva v. Shalala, 946 F.Supp. 747, 752 (D. Ariz. 1996), affd, 152 F.3d
1115 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd and remanded, 119 S. Ct. 1573 (1999), rev'd and
remanded, 185 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 1999).
160. Grijalva,152 F.3d at 1121.

161. Grijalva,946 F. Supp. at 752.
162. Grijalva,152 F.3d at 1120.
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The courts in the Grijalva decisions also addressed the issue of what
specific notice and appeal rights must be provided by Medicare HMOs."'
Since Medicare beneficiaries' benefits and due process rights are not
reduced simply because the benefits are provided by a Medicare HMO,
rather than a fee-for-service medical provider, the same degree of due
process protection must be provided to Medicare HMO enrollees as to
Medicare beneficiaries in fee-for-service plans.'6 Federal statutes indicate
that hearing rights must be extended to any beneficiary "who is
dissatisfied by reason of his failure to receive any health service to which
he believes he is entitled...,,1 65 This triggering condition for when an
individual is entitled to a hearing is extremely broad. Whenever a
Medicare beneficiary believes that coverage for medical
care has been
6
improperly denied, he or she is entitled to a hearing.1
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit reviewed the Mathews
factors and concluded that: 1) the individual interest at stake was
significantly greater than in Mathews; 2) the notice and hearing rights

provided by Medicare HMOs failed to comply with statutory
requirements and failed to provide assurance that the decision making
process was reliable; and 3) there was no undue burden placed on the
government by requiring Medicare HMOs to comply with the due process
requirements already detailed in the Medicare statute.
The court
required that Medicare HMOs provtide timely notice for each and every
denial of coverage.
The Ninth Circuit, upholding the district court,
required that Medicare HMOs provide timely notice for each and every
denial of coverage.16' The district court required Medicare HMOs to
163. Id. at 1123 (".... the Eldridge factors point to a need for additional
procedural protections for Medicare beneficiaries in HMO's ......
164. 42 C.F.R. §§ 417.414(b), 417.600(a) (1999).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(B) (1995). The right to a full hearing is limited to
cases in which the amount in controversy is $100 or more. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.701.
However, in Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146, 158-59 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
the court found that some kind of in-person hearing must be provided even in
cases with smaller amounts in controversy.
166. Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1121-28 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd and
remanded, 119 S.Ct. 1573 (1999), rev'd and remanded, 185 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir.
1999).; see also 42 C.F.R. § 417.600(a).
167. Grijalva,152 F.3d at 1121.
168. Id.

169. Id. The notice must include information about the reason for the denial,
a description of appeal and hearing rights, and information regarding how to
obtain evidence to challenge the denial. Id.
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provide expedited hearings when acute care was at issue, including, under
170
some circumstances, pre-termination hearings.
4.
Recent Developments in Due ProcessAnalysis-American
Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan7
The Supreme Court has yet to address directly the issues raised by
managed care in Medicaid and Medicare. The first of the cases raising
these issues to reach the Court, Grijalva, was reversed and remanded for
reconsideration in light of its decision in American Manufacturers Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Sullivan." The American Manufacturers decision indicates a
possible new direction which the Court may pursue in analyzing when due
process is required in decisions affecting Medicaid and Medicare
entitlements. Moving in such a direction would be a serious error.
In American Manufacturers, claimants asserted that a change in state
7
workers' compensation regulations violated their due process rights. 1
The new regulations permitted an insurer to suspend payment of workers'
compensation benefits while an appeal was pending to determine the
reasonableness and necessity of a treating doctor's prescription of medical
treatment. 74 The Court found that there was no entitlement to worker's
compensation benefits, until after the treating doctor's prescription was
confirmed on appeal. 7 Since there was no entitlement, the worker had
no property interest in such coverage; therefore, no due process
protections were constitutionally required . 176
As discussed above, government entitlements have long been
77
recognized as property rights, requiring due process protection.
However, the Court's decision in American Manufacturers appears to
suggest a novel and revolutionary conception of what constitutes an

170. Grijalva v. Shalala, Civ. 93-711 TUC ACM, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22861
(D. Ct. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2000).
171. 526 U.S 40 (1999).
172. Id. at 48.
173. Id. at 45-46.
174. Id. at 60-61.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-73 (1975). "Protected interests in
property are normally 'not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created
and their dimensions are defined' by an independent source such as state statutes
or rules entitling the citizen to certain benefits." Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
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entitlement.' According to this reasoning, no entitlement, and therefore
no property interest, exists until a determination has been made that the
individual is entitled to the specific benefit sought. Therefore, the
requirements of due process cannot apply to the entitlement
determination itself, since the property interest does not arise until after
that determination has been made in the individual's favor.
If this reasoning is followed to its logical conclusion, it is hard to see
when due process protections could apply in any entitlement context. The
American Manufacturers decision distinguished cases such as Goldberg
and Mathews by pointing out that in those cases, the eligibility for benefits
had already been established, and the issue was whether or not current
benefits could be terminated. 179 However, an individual is only entitled to
receive any government benefit so long as he or she continues to meet the
eligibility criteria required by statute. The mere fact that a person was
eligible in the past does not entitle that person to current or future
benefits. The application of American Manufacturers reasoning would
appear to indicate that, once the government found that an individual's
eligibility to receive the benefits had ended, the individual would have no
property interest in the benefits. Therefore, the individual would have no
due process rights in their termination, until it had been determined that
the individual continued to be eligible (a determination that might never
be made, considering that the individual would have no due process right
to notice and a hearing regarding their eligibility).
The implications of the American Manufacturers argument are
profound. In that case, the Court did not find that the due process rights
of the individuals were adequately protected by the existing legal
procedures. Instead, the Court held that those individuals were not
entitled to any due process at all with regard to unemployment benefits,
until their eligibility for the particular benefit claimed had already been
established.
The crucial question is: When does a claim to receive

178. See Am. Mfrs. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59-60 (1999).
[A]n employee is not entitled to payment for all medical treatment once
the employer's initial liability is established ....
Instead, the law
expressly limits an employee's entitlement to 'reasonable' and 'necessary'
medical treatment, and requires that disputes over the reasonableness
and necessity of particular treatment must be resolved before an
employer's obligation to pay - and an employee's entitlement to benefits
- arise. Id. at 60.
179. Id.
180. The Court presumably did not intend to go so far. The Court made the
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government benefits become an entitlement requiring due process?
According to American Manufacturers, the physician's medical treatment
prescription does not establish the reasonableness and necessity of that
treatment to a degree of certainty required to make the payment for that
treatment an entitlement.
This determination can only be made upon
appeal."" Only then, according to the Court, do the requirements of due
process come into play."' Accordingly, no due process scrutiny may be
applied to any of the procedures for determining eligibility prior to that
point. The Court permits the government to set a higher standard of
proof of eligibility which the individual must meet before due process
comes into play. It is not apparent from the American Manufacturers
T
decision that there is any limit to where this initial standard may be set. 8
The American Manufactures decision becomes more notable when
examined against the backdrop of prior due process cases. In other cases
concerning entitlements, the courts have looked to the reasonable
expectations of individuals, to establish whether or not a particular claim
had become an "entitlement" triggering due process protection.185 While

distinction between "claims for payment" and "payments" which indicates that
the government could not cut off all means of adjudicating claims without due
process, since those claims would presumably be regarded as property even if the
payments themselves are not. Id. at 60 n.13.
181. Id. at 60.
182. Id. at 59-60. "[D]isputes over the reasonableness and necessity of
particular treatment must be resolved before an employer's obligation to pay and an employee's entitlement to benefits - arise."
183. Presumably, under this reasoning, if the statute provided that the appeals
process could take up to ten years, without any payment of interest in the interim,
there would still be no basis for challenge, since at this stage of the process there is
no entitlement, and therefore there can be no deprivation of property, and no
right to any due process at all. Under such a scheme, of course, all employers
would have an incentive to initially deny all coverage, as payment could be
deferred without cost. In fact, the statute required that appeals be completed
within 30 days, and required employers to pay 10% annual interest on bills which
were upheld on appeal. Id.
184. After the original appeal, there were other levels of review as to whether
an individual was eligible for payment for a particular medical treatment. Why
could the government not establish that the entitlement does not come into being
until all administrative review, or indeed, all judicial review, is completed? Only
then would all "disputes over the reasonableness and necessity of particular
treatment... be resolved."

185. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 253 n.8 (1970). "Much of the
existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights which do not fall within
traditional common-law concepts of property... 'Such sources of security.., are
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there is, of course, an ineluctable element of circularity in such a standard
(an expectation of receiving a benefit is "reasonable" when the individual
is entitled to receive the benefit), the factual inquiry is a familiar one.
What do most people expect under similar circumstances? For what
reasons do they expect it? Are such expectations generally borne out?
Do we wish, as a matter of policy, to encourage such expectations? This
traditional standard, if it were applied in the cases involving due process
rights in medical treatment, would focus the inquiry where it belongs.
Do people generally rely on their doctors' prescription of treatment as
proof that the treatment is reasonable and necessary? Is such prescription
in itself a good measure of medical reasonableness and necessity? What
might make a doctor's prescription of treatment questionable as a
measure of medical reasonableness and necessity? Is the doctor's
prescription generally accepted in other contexts as establishing the
reasonableness and necessity of treatment? Do we want, as a matter of
public policy, people to be able to rely on their doctors' treatment
prescriptions?
American Manufacturers attempts to return due process jurisprudence
to the pre-Goldberg era, when the government was free to extend or
restrict entitlement benefits arbitrarily, without being subject to due
process requirements. These benefits are created by the government.
Absent the government's creation of the entitlement, individuals would
have no right to receive such benefits and no property interest in them.
Due process requirements would therefore not apply when an individual
is denied such benefits.
It is clear that legislative bodies can
constitutionally modify or eliminate entitlement systems, and can change
the requirements for eligibility.
However, prior to American
Manufacturers,it had long been understood that the government's ability
to modify entitlements by restricting procedural notice and hearing rights
was strictly limited by the constraints of due process."'
Once a
beneficiary showed a prima facie basis for eligibility under the applicable

no longer regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to the recipients they are essentials,
fully deserved . 'Id. (quoting Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The
Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965)); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 601 (1972) ("A person's interest in a benefit is a 'property' interest for
due process purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings
that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit ....
");
see generally Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
186. See generally Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 254; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976).
'..
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entitlement rules, the entitlement was established, and due process
protections attached. 117 If governments can limit entitlement benefits by
limiting when due process protections apply, it is unclear what role the
courts have to play in enforcing due process in any entitlement eligibility
process.
B.

The Treatment Decision and the CoverageDecision

The essential distinction which has run through this analysis of the
requirements of due process in Medicaid and Medicare is the distinction
between the treatment decision and the coverage decision. The treatment
decision was traditionally made by a medical professional, in the
unfettered exercise of her/his professional judgment. That decision did
not turn on interpretation of legal definitions or eligibility rules, but on
objective, scientific standards of proper medical treatment. The medical
professional was not subject to systematic incentives to decide to forego
providing medical treatment.
Accordingly, the doctor-patient
relationship was essentially closed, with duties and obligations flowing
between the two, unaffected by outside parties.
By contrast, the coverage decision in Medicaid and Medicare was
traditionally made by a bureaucrat, trained in the interpretation and
application of complex statutory and regulatory rules and standards.189
The initial decision maker's interpretation of these statutes and rules was
subject to reconsideration by higher level decision makers and, ultimately,
to judicial review.90 While individual decision makers were not subject to
personal incentives to deny coverage, the system of decision making
included mechanisms intended to limit program costs. The decision
maker had responsibilities to the program, as well as to the beneficiary.
It has long been established that constitutional due process
requirements that apply to the coverage decision are inapplicable to the
medical treatment decision. 91 So long as those two decisions were clearly
distinguishable, the requirements of due process were fairly
straightforward. It is when the distinction between the treatment decision
and the coverage decision has broken down, such that the two decisions
187. See, e.g., Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261-62 ("Appellant does not contend that
procedural due process is not applicable to the termination of welfare benefits.
Such benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement to those qualified to receive
them.").
188. Orentlicher, supra note 11, at 158.
189. 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.10(c); 405.702, 405.801 (1999).
190. §§ 405.720, 405.730, 431.205.
191. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1003-05 (1982).
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are made at the same time, and/or by the same decision maker, that the
requirements of due process in this context become confused and unclear.
By focusing on this distinction, it is possible to make sense of the due
process jurisprudence which has developed in the Medicaid and Medicare
context, and to determine the constitutional implications of managed care
in these programs. The Medicaid/Medicare coverage decisions deal with a
constitutionally protected right, the property right of an eligible
beneficiary to receive covered benefits in an entitlement program.
Decisions that deal only with whether or not a particular patient should
receive a particular medical treatment do not directly implicate
constitutionally protected rights.' 9 By examining when decisions relating
to medical treatment also affect constitutionally protected rights, we can
determine when such decisions are subject to due process requirements.
In Goldberg and Mathews, constitutional rights were undisputedly at
stake in the eligibility decision, and due process was required in the
decision making process. The degree of due process protection required
depended in part on the degree to which the decision at issue was seen to
be mainly a coverage decision or mainly a treatment decision.

93

In other

cases involving medical treatment decisions in non-Medicaid/Medicare
contexts, due process is required when constitutional rights are at stake,
such as the liberty interest in not being committed to a mental hospital, or
the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment through
deprivation of adequate medical care in prison. 9
T

192. It is for this reason that the analysis offered here is not applicable to
cases involving managed care for privately insured individuals. Due process is not
implicated because no constitutional right is at stake. Traditionally, treatment
decisions were also presumed to be more reliable and less subject to error or bias
than coverage decisions.
Managed care has dramatically changed this
presumption, leading to much of the current policy debate and litigation regarding
privately insured patients' rights to challenge managed care treatment/coverage
decisions. Discussion of these issues in the context of private insurance is beyond
the scope of this article.
193. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 322 (1976). "[T]he decision whether
to discontinue disability benefits will turn, in most cases, upon 'routine, standard,
and unbiased medical reports by physician specialists,'concerning a subject whom
they have personally examined." Id. (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
404 (1971)).
194. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1985); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
For a discussion of the constitutionality of managed care in prisons, see Ira D.
Robbins, Managed Care in Prisons as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 90 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMONOLGY 1 (forthcoming 2000). Robbins argues that, because managed
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In Blum, the Court erred when it failed to acknowledge that all
coverage decisions are subject to due process protections even when the
coverage decision is merged with a treatment decision. The merger of the
two decisions does not deprive affected individuals of their constitutional
right to due process protections in the coverage decision. Rather than the
treatment decision immunizing the coverage decision from due process
requirements, the coverage decision infects the treatment decision with
constitutional considerations.
Lower courts have recognized that the merger of the treatment and
coverage decisions required that due process protections be extended to
the merged decision.'9
Grijalva is the only case in which a court has
specifically identified the merging of the treatment decision with the
coverage decision as giving rise to due process rights in the decisionmaking process, w 6 although other cases and commentators have implicitly
recognized the importance of this integration of different decisions. 97

care creates incentives for medical providers to base medical treatment decisions
on factors other than the medical needs of prisoners, it may constitute "deliberate
indifference" in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
195. J.K. v. Dillenberg, 836 F. Supp. 694, 696 (D. Ariz. 1993); Kraemer v.
Heckler, 737 F.2d 214, 222 (2d Cir. 1984); Catanzano v. Dowling, 60 F.3d 113, 120
(2d Cir. 1995); Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305, 1312-13 (M.D. Tenn. 1996);
Grijalva v. Shalala, 946 F. Supp. 747, 752 (D. Ariz. 1996), afftd, 152 F.3d 1115 (9th
Cir. 1998), rev'd and remanded, 119 S. Ct. 1573 (1999), rev'd and remanded, 185
F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 1999).
196. Grijalva,946 F. Supp. at 752.
197. See, e.g., Catanzano, 60 F.3d at 119. "(T]he URC's decision did not
resemble an independent professional judgment, because the record indicated that
the judgement was 'governed largely by statute, regulation, [federal government]
manuals, and transmittal letters."' Id. (citing Kraemer, 737 F.2d at 220); see also
Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 372 (7th Cir. 1998), rev'd __ U.S. -, 120 S. Ct.
2143 (2000).
The Plan dictated that the very same HMO administrators vested with
the authority to determine whether health care claims would be paid, and
the type, nature, and duration of care to be given, were those physicians
who became eligible to receive year-end bonuses as a result of costsavings. Id.
The Supreme Court decision in Pegram re-emphasized the integration of the
treatment and coverage decisions, although it reversed the lower court's
conclusions as to the effect of such integration on the application of ERISA to
managed care. Constitutional rights, and due process requirements, were not at
stake in that case. See also Marc. A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor:
Divided Physician Loyalties and Obligationsin a Changing Health Care System, 21
AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 253-54 (1995).
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For these reasons, to the extent that managed care conflates the
treatment and coverage decision by allowing the initial coverage decision
to be made by the medical provider, managed care in the Medicaid and
Medicare context subjects the treatment decision to statutory and
constitutional due process requirements. Even if Congress were to amend
the notice and hearing rights currently required by statutes and
regulations for Medicaid and Medicare denials and terminations, the
Constitution imposes a minimum due process standard on Medicaid and
Medicare coverage decisions.
In order for managed care to pass
constitutional scrutiny in the Medicaid and Medicare context, each
combined coverage/treatment decision must meet the minimum
constitutional standard.

C.

The Requirement of the Unbiased Decision Maker

The most basic requirement of procedural due process under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments is that of an unbiased decision maker.19 8 No
matter what other procedural protections may exist, a determination
cannot meet the minimum requirements of fairness if the decision is made
by someone who has a financial stake in the outcome."9 9 The complex
systems of notice and appeal rights which have been developed through
Medicaid and Medicare statutes and rules are not constitutionally
mandated in their entireties. Congress can modify the notice and hearing
rights to which Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries are entitled, within
the due process constraints imposed by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Modifications or limitations on those rights have been
proposed as a way to make due process requirements less burdensome in

198. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) ("[O]f course, an
impartial decision maker is essential."); Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523
(1927) ("[I]t certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment... to subject...
liberty or property to the judgment of a court, the judge of which has a direct,
personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his
case.").
199. In considering and denying a due process challenge to Medicare Part B
carrier hearings, the Court indicated that, while due process required that the
carrier hearing officer be unbiased and impartial, neither the carriers nor their
hearing officers failed to meet that requirement, because neither had any
pecuniary interest in denying coverage. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188,
196 (1982). Clearly, if the decision maker in Schweiker had had such an interest,
the decision making process would have violated the due process requirement of
an unbiased decision maker.
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the managed care context.2 0 However, no notice and hearing system can
pass constitutional muster if the minimum requirements of due process,
including the requirement of an unbiased decision maker, are not met.
Medical providers in traditional fee-for-service medical practice had no
financial incentive to deny medical treatment to patients. Rather,
providers gained financially from prescribing treatment. This financial
incentive to treat resulted in concerns that the providers' decisions
authorizing treatment were affected by the providers' financial interest
and were not simply objective exercises of medical expertise.' Because
of this feared bias in favor of prescribing more care than necessary, many
Medicaid and Medicare entities created procedural systems to review
medical providers' treatment decisions in order to correct for this

potential bias.' °2

Essentially, additional procedural protections were

added to protect the government programs from the unfairness of
doctors' financial biases in treatment decisions and to reduce the cost of
203
care.

200. Jost, supra note 18, at 39; Gladieux, supra note 46, at 61; Ezekial J.
Emanuel & Lee Goldman, Protecting Patient Welfare in Managed Care: Six
Safeguards, 23 J. H. POL. POL'Y & L. 635, 636 (1998); Eleanor D. Kinney, Behind

the Veil Where the Action Is: PrivatePolicy Making and American Health Care, 51
ADMIN. L. REV. 145 (1999).
201. See Emanuel & Goldman, supra note 200, at 637-38.

Conflicts of interest by commission occur when physicians have a
financial or other incentive to provide more care than is appropriate.
Conflicts of interest by commission are inherent in the fee-for-service
system of reimbursement. Conflicts of interest by omission occur when
physicians receive payments or some other benefit to provide less care
than is appropriate. Conflicts of interest by omission are inherent in
capitated health systems. Id.
202. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 466.71 (1999).
203. Managed care in theory reduces the costs of providing medical care by
avoiding unnecessary treatments, tests, and institutionalizations, seeking more
cost-effective forms of care, providing preventative care, thereby reducing the
need to treat more costly illness, and by using market power to reduce payments
to providers. Managed care can also reduce the cost of medical care for Medicaid
and Medicare beneficiaries by denying necessary covered care in violation of the
rights of those beneficiaries. Failing to provide constitutionally mandated due
process to Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries results in a decline in the amount
of care provided to such beneficiaries, as well as a decline in the administrative
costs of the programs (notices, appeals, hearings, etc.). The procedural
requirements of due process in Medicaid and Medicare in themselves cost money,
just as in any other context. In addition, given the frequent lack of alternative
means to pay for medical services, and the possibly fatal consequences of non-
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With the advent of managed care, these financial incentives affecting
medical providers' treatment decisions were reversed. 204 Most MCOs
receipt, denial of due process saves money not only intrinsically, but also by
serving as an invisible reduction in health care. The actual effect of managed care
on the cost to the federal government of insuring Medicare beneficiaries is
unclear. It is estimated that health care costs are 11% less for Medicare managed
care enrollees than for fee-for-service beneficiaries, controlling for the health
status of the patient population.
However, Medicare has paid MCOs
approximately 5.7% more per enrollee than it would have paid had these
individuals received the same care under a fee-for-service plan. See Oberlander,
supra note 2, at 606. The discrepancy is due to excessively high Medicare
capitation rates, resulting from biased selection of Medicare HMO enrollees.
Medicare's adjusted average per capita cost (AAPC) risk adjustment system has
been unable to successfully approximate' the average cost of treating different
populations of Medicare HMO enrollees. The cost of care for Medicare
beneficiaries is distributed extremely unevenly: 10% of beneficiaries account for
70% of Medicare spending. Id. at 605. Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in HMOs
have come from a disproportionately healthy segment of the Medicare population.
Id. at 606-607. This biased selection of HMO enrollees is due in part to selfselection. Beneficiaries suffering from chronic health problems are less likely to
enroll in a plan which will restrict their choice of health care providers, often
requiring that they change doctors or depriving them of access to specialists. Id.
Medicare HMOs also engage in activities collectively known as "cherry-picking,"
to ensure a biased selection of healthier-than-average enrollees. HMOs market
selectively to healthier beneficiaries, through their advertising and through the
kinds of coverage they offer (e.g., fitness programs rather than diabetes care). Id.
HMOs also have an incentive to create barriers to utilization and to make appeal
rights as ineffective as possible. So long as beneficiaries have the freedom to opt
out of Medicare managed care and into fee-for-service at any time, they will not
pursue a difficult and time-consuming appeals process. Rather, they will simply
switch to fee-for-service if they become sick and encounter difficulties in receiving
care.
204. Buchanan, supra note 2, at 619.
A managed care organization combines health care insurance and the
delivery of a broad range of integrated health care services for
populations of plan enrollees, financing the services prospectively from a
predicted, limited budget. At present the following cost-containment
techniques are often identified with managed care: (1) payment limits
(e.g., diagnosis-related groupings [DRGs] for Medicare hospital fees); (2)
requirement of preauthorization for certain services (e.g., surgeries); (3)
the use of primary care physicians as "gatekeepers" to control referral to
specialists; (4) so-called "de-skilling" (using less highly trained providers
for certain services than was customary during the pre-managed care,
third-party fee-for-service era); and (5) financial incentives for physicians

Journalof Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 17:135

(including those in which the vast majority of Medicaid and Medicare
beneficiaries are enrolled) receive a fixed payment per enrollee per year,
The MCO
regardless of the amount of care provided to that enrollee.
assumes the risk that the enrollee might require care that would exceed
the capitated rate of compensation.? The MCO profits to the extent that
it provides care costing less than the capitation rate to an enrollee. 2°7
MCOs require pre-authorization before they will pay for certain medical
care.20 8 Accordingly, MCOs have a direct financial incentive to refuse
authorization.
MCOs pass those incentives along to their contracting medical
209
Since physicians' treatment decisions are
providers in various ways.
estimated to control approximately 75% of all health care spending, most
attempts to limit spending have focused on influencing and/or controlling
210
Physicians providing care under contract with an MCO
those decisions.
may be compensated fixed amounts for treating patients with specific
211
If the provider can provide fewer days of care to a patient
diagnoses.
than expected for that patient's diagnosis, the provider pockets the

to limit utilization of care (e.g., year-end bonuses or holdbacks of
payments that physicians receive only if they do not exceed specified
utilization limits). In addition, managed care increasingly employs data
from outcome (efficacy) studies to develop practice guidelines and for the
ongoing assessment and refinement of diagnostic services and treatment
services. Id.
205. Kevin E. Thorpe, The Health System in Transition. Care, Cost and
Coverage, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 339, 341-342 (1997).
206. Id.

207. Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305, 1308 (M.D. Tenn. 1996). "MCOs
make a profit to the extent that their total income in flat fees exceeds the amount
that the MCO pays.., for treating sick enrollees." Id.
208. Buchanan, supra note 2, at 619.
209. A July 1997 study in the Journal of the American Medical Association
indicated that, while 79% of doctors in fee-for-service practice felt that they were
able to treat patients according to their best judgment, only 51% of doctors in
managed care organizations felt the same. See Kerr et al., Primary Care
Physicians' Satisfaction with Quality of Care in California Capitated Medical
Groups, 278 JAMA 308 (1997).
210. See generally Emanuel & Goldman, supra note 200.
211. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 412.60 et seq. (1999) (describing Medicare hospital
Diagnostic Related Groups, or DRGs.) While Medicare DRGs are not always
categorized under the rubric of managed care, they present a similar attempt to
limit health care costs by shifting the risk of "excessive" care to the health care
provider.

Due Processand Managed Care

20001

212

additional profit.
If the patient receives more care than the fixed
payment for that patient's condition, the provider loses money.213
Alternatively, physicians' compensation may be on a capitated basis, so
214
that the doctors directly assume the risk of "excessive" care.
The
doctors may also be rewarded with financial incentives, such as bonuses
for low utilization of medical care by a doctor's patients, or may be
threatened with penalties for prescribing
"excessive" care, including
'21
1
withholding of payments and "de-listing.
Primary care doctors act as "gatekeepers," whoseS . approval
must be
216
obtained before patients can be referred to specialists.
Plan doctors
who provide too much care, who advocate for their patients to obtain care
denied by the MCO, or who otherwise increase health care costs above
the level established by the MCO, may be terminated from the MCO at
will, depriving those doctors of access to their patient base.2 ' Given the
market power of MCOs in the health care sector today, doctors who are
218
de-listed may lose their livelihood .
Due to this complex arrangement of financial incentives for medical
providers under managed care to reduce or deny care, medical providers'
treatment decisions, traditionally assumed
.. 219 to be without personal bias and
based purely on professional expertise, must be seen in a new light. The

212. Id.
213. 42 C.F.R. § 412.42(a).
214. Orentlicher, supra note 11, at 155; M.R. Gold et al., A NationalSurvey of
the Arrangements Managed-Care Plans Make with Physicians, 333 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1678, 1680 (1995).
215. Over 60% of MCOs withhold a percentage of participating physicians'
salaries as a penalty for prescribing "excessive" care. Over 35% of all MCOs give
physicians bonuses as a reward for limiting care. Emanuel & Goldman, supra
note 200, at 636-37; see also, Orentlicher, supra note 11, at 160.
216. John P. Little, Note, Managed Care Contracts of Adhesion: Terminating

the Doctor-PatientRelationship and Endangering Patient Health, 49 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1397, 1411 (1997).

217. See Kinney, supra note 200, at 156. "[MCOs] exercise considerable
power over physicians because they directly control the supply of insured
patients." Id.
218. Bryan Liang, PatientInjury Incentives in Law, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
1, 56-58 (1998).
219. As the Blum Court stated, in upholding the state Medicaid program's
reliance on doctors' evaluations to determine Medicaid eligibility, "[t]here is no
suggestion that those [medical] decisions were influenced in any degree by the
State's obligation to adjust benefits in conformity with changes in the cost of
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treatment/coverage decision is no longer based on the unbiased exercise
of professional judgment, but is potentially based in part on
considerations of personal financial benefit. Under managed care,
frequently the MCO, directly or indirectly, makes the decisions as to
whether care will be provided.uO
Not only are MCOs subject to direct financial incentives to deny care,
they have also had considerable success in avoiding tort liability damages
resulting from negligent decision making by asserting that their affiliated
medical providers are independent contractors. 221 In addition to the
independent contractor shield, MCOs have argued that they should not
be held liable in tort for treatment decisions because the Medicaid and
Medicare statutes and regulations pre-empt state court jurisdiction and
remedies. 122 Thus, not only do MCOs have a financial incentive to deny
care, they generally are not subject to the countervailing incentives to
provide quality care traditionally provided by liability for medical
malpractice. Substantial financial incentives influence both MCOs and
their contracting medical providers to deny or fail to prescribe medical
care. Because of this inherent bias, the determinations of MCOs and their
providers present a serious "risk of erroneous deprivation2 23 of Medicaid
and Medicare benefits.
medically necessary care." 457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1987).
220. Liang, supra note 218, at 61; Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 372
(1998) (describing MCO directors as medical decision makers), rev'd on other
grounds, Pegram v. Herdrich, _ US _, 120 S.Ct. 2143 (2000).

221. Liang, supra note 218, at 51-56. At common law, employers could not be
held liable for actions of independent contractors. "It is important that the actual
decisionmakers involved in authorizing or denying health care benefits face
liability." Id. at 80.
222. In the private managed care context, ERISA has proved a potent,
though not impregnable, shield to MCO liability for coverage denials. See
generally Liang, supra note 218. Discussion of the vexing issue of ERISA
preemption in the private managed care context is beyond the scope of this article.
While claims for Medicare benefits are preempted by the Medicare statute,
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before judicial review may be
sought, U.S. v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201 (1982); Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602
(1984), other claims which are not "inextricably intertwined" with claims for
benefits do not require such exhaustion. Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family
Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986). In recent decisions, some courts have allowed
publicly financed MCOs to be sued for medical malpractice in state court. Schlier
v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 876 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Ardary v. Aetna
Health Plans of California, 98 F.3d 496 (9th Cir. 1996); Wartenberg v. Aetna U.S.
Healthcare, 2 F. Supp. 2d 273 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
223. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 336 (1976).
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The issue of the biased managed care decision maker has been raised in
224
many of the recent cases dealing with managed care issues. Courts have
noted that
[djue process is not met when a claim dispute is resolved by an
adjudicator who has a 'direct, personal, substantial pecuniary
interest' in the [sic] ruling against one party in the action ....
MCOs have a direct and substantial pecuniary interest in
225
denying or delaying costly services for which MCOs must pay.
Courts have also found that third-party treatment/coverage decisionmaking which deprives patients of the unbiased, independent medical
judgment of their physician may result in medical malpractice liability of
226
third-party insurer.
224. Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 372; Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305, 1308
(M.D. Tenn. 1996), vacated in part by Daniels v. Menke, 145 F.3d 1330 (6th Cir.
1998).
225. Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. at 1313 (citing Tumey v. State of Ohio,
273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)) (additional citations omitted).
226. Wickline v. California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). One
of the most serious consequences of managed care is that, by imposing incentives
on doctors to deny treatment, it deprives the Medicaid/Medicare beneficiary of
the assistance of the treating physician as an advocate within the coverage
decision-making process. The formal due process system of notice and hearing
places the burden of enforcing and protecting rights to receive covered treatment
on the patient - someone who, in the Medicaid and Medicare context, is likely to
be poor, elderly and/or disabled, and sick. This same objection applies to the many
proposed reforms which seek to increase consumer information and market
competition as a means of protecting the rights of managed care consumers.
A complex procedural system is best suited to protecting the rights of the wellinformed, the healthy and energetic, and those with the confidence to use the
system to their advantage. To the extent that the individual must pursue and
defend his or her rights in a complex, formal system without outside assistance,
the most vulnerable individuals will receive the least protection. For such a
system to provide effective protection to even the most vulnerable, these
individuals must have access to the assistance of an advocate possessing the
knowledge and experience needed to participate in the system.
Traditionally, such advocacy was provided by the treating physician, who had the
expert knowledge and experience with the hearing system, and who was subject to
professional and financial incentives to act as advocate for the patient. By
creating incentives which divide the loyalties of medical providers between their
professional duty to their patients and their own professional and financial well
being, managed care has deprived the sick and vulnerable of perhaps the most
effective protection of their entitlement to receive covered health care - the
advocacy of their own treating physician. See Rodwin, supra note 197, at 241;
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For all of these reasons, minimum constitutional due process requires
that Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries be able to appeal each
determination of medical coverage to an impartial entity outside the
MCO incentive structure. Because MCOs and their medical providers
determine Medicaid and Medicare coverage at the same time that they
determine medical treatment, and because they are subject to systematic
financial incentives to deny coverage and treatment, these decisions
inherently violate constitutional due process."' In all such decisions,
Little, supra note 216, at 1397.
Managed care deprives Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries of their best
potential advocate, one who is present in all health care decision-making, and is
therefore, at least in theory, available to assist the beneficiary in all disputes.
Under managed care, not only are sick and vulnerable beneficiaries deprived of
this assistance in pursuing their rights to receive covered care, but the medical
provider often opposes the beneficiary in the coverage dispute. Thus, the ability
of the sick, the poor, the uneducated, and the frail elderly to make effective use of
the formal due process system is substantially reduced under managed care.
227. If Medicaid or Medicare beneficiaries do request treatment from the
MCO, or if the treating physician orders treatment, which is then denied by the
MCO, then the obligation to give notice and extend hearing rights falls to the
MCO itself. Most MCOs are for-profit businesses which primarily provide private
health insurance. MCO employees have no necessary experience or familiarity
with Medicaid and Medicare rules and statutes.
MCOs which come into Medicaid markets from private managed care
settings may be used to dealing with enrollees in a much more
Concepts
peremptory fashion than is permitted in a public program ....
of due process are alien to their experience, and to their expectations as
to how managed care should operate. Bonneyman, supra note 98, at 4.
Few MCOs are accustomed to provide basic due process requirements such as
notices of denial of coverage and impartial hearings to their private plan enrollees.
As the district court found in Grijalva v. Shalala, 946 F. Supp. 747, 757-58 (D.
Ariz. 1996), affd, 152 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd and remanded, 119 S. Ct.
1573 (1999), rev'd and remanded, 185 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 1999), most notices
issued by Medicare MCOs are illegible, fail to give specific reasons for the denial
of services, fail to give accurate and complete information about appeal and
hearing rights, and/or are otherwise legally inadequate. A large proportion of
Medicaid and Medicare MCO enrollees are not effectively made aware of their
appeal rights in adverse coverage decisions, or of how to pursue those rights.
The interest at stake in Medicaid and Medicare managed care is a most crucial
one - it can be literally a matter of life and death. "[T]he private interest at stake
[in receiving Medicare coverage of hospitalization] should be weighed more
heavily than in Eldridge because of the astronomical nature of medical costs."
Kraemer v. Heckler, 737 F.2d 214, 222 (2d Cir. 1984). "[T]he potential for
irreparable damage is surely great when it comes to denial of medical services ....
In many, if not most, cases, the denial of coverage may result in total failure to
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Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries are entitled to immediate and
effective notice of all decisions by medical providers to deny
treatment/coverage, and to a prompt appeal to an unbiased decision
maker.
V.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECISION NOT TO
TREAT

In the traditional fee-for-service context, the event which triggers
notice and hearing rights is the government's denial of payment for a
228
particular medical treatment.
In Medicaid and Medicare
managed care,
. .229
the due process rights of beneficiaries are unchanged .

However, in the

receive the services." Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd
and remanded, 119 S. Ct. 1573 (1999), rev'd and remanded, 185 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir.
1999). Given the high cost of medical care, denial of coverage, in many cases, is
equivalent to denial of medical care.
Mistakes or poor performance by MCOs can result in denials of needed
medical care. In other words, in a managed care environment, what is at
stake is no longer just money and the disposition of provider claims, but
the actual lives and health of program beneficiaries.
In such
circumstances, due process becomes critically important as the chief
means for beneficiaries to protect themselves from erroneous or
improper denials of care. Bonneyman, supra note 98, at 1.
The wrongful denial of Medicaid or Medicare coverage will frequently inflict
serious injury on the beneficiary, which may not be remediable. Irremediable
injury is more likely for Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries than for other health
insurance enrollees because such a disproportionately high number of these
beneficiaries are elderly and/or disabled. These groups tend to have more
pressing health care needs than the general population.
The elderly require, on average, substantially more medical treatment than the
younger, employed enrollees who have historically constituted the bulk of HMO
memberships. It is therefore feared that HMO cost-containment strategies, such
as reducing hospitalization and restricting access to specialists, will have especially
adverse effects on health care for the elderly. Oberlander, supra note 2, at 604.
The effects of the denial of either Medicaid or Medicare benefits is like the effects
of the denial of welfare benefits in Goldberg. "[T]ermination of aid pending
resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the
very means by which to live while he waits." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264
(1970). "Unlike Mathews, the deprivation suffered from an HMO denial to
provide care cannot so easily be remedied by retroactive recoupment of benefits,"
Grijalva,152 F.2d at 1121 (quoting Grijalva, 946 F. Supp at 757).
228. 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.702, 405.804, 431.210, 431.222 (1999).
229. Grijalva, 946 F. Supp at 753.
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managed care context, -it is often much less clear when an event occurs
which should trigger due process notice and hearing rights. Medicaid
MCO enrollees are entitled to hearing rights whenever a "claim for
assistance is denied or not acted upon promptly." 230 Medicare MCO
enrollees have the right to a hearing when they are "dissatisfied because
they do not receive health care services to which they believe they are
entitled to, at no greater cost than they believe they are required to
pay."'2 3' The statutory language describing the triggering event for due
process protections to arise is very broad and inclusive.
However, in the managed care context, the initial "denial" of a request
for health care services comes most often not from an official in a
Medicaid or Medicare agency, presumably versed in the statutes and rules
governing those programs, but from a primary care physician. 23 Health
care coverage is "denied" by the doctor, who fails or refuses to order a
test, prescribe a treatment, or make a referral to a specialist. 33 Unless
[T]he Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services] has
not referred this Court to, and this Court has not found, any provision in
the Medicare statutes or regulations pertaining to HMOs, to suggest that
beneficiaries of Medicare who are denied services by HMOs are entitled
to any less procedural due process than beneficiaries who are denied feefor-service coverage. Id.;
Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305, 1312-13 (M.D. Tenn. 1996). "[T]he state
Medicaid managed care program violate[s] the Fourteenth Amendment's
procedural due process requirements when they deprive enrollees of benefits
prior to a hearing in which the Medicaid Act would require continuation of
benefits pending a fair hearing." Id.
230. 42 C.F.R. § 431.200 (1999).
231. § 417.600(a)(2)(ii).
232. Eleanor D. Kinney, Consumer Grievances and Appeal Procedures in
Managed Care Plans, 10 (3) HEALTH LAW. 17, 19-20 (1998). "In a managed care
plan, the crucial action defining the appealable event becomes the clinical decision
of the physician regarding the amount, duration and scope of services provided to
the patient." Id.
233. "Denial" is treated here as something of a misnomer, since the physician
with an incentive to minimize treatment may effectively "deny" treatment by
failing to tell the Medicaid or Medicare beneficiary of the possibility of treatment.
Laypersons cannot request treatment which they do not know exists. See id. at 19.
[U]nder traditional payment arrangements in which payers paid for all
services ordered unless specifically not covered, coverage disputes were
generally clearly delineated. But now, many managed care plans impose
financial or incentives on physicians not to order services, so the
physician may simply determine not to provide a service to a patient,
often without indicating that the service is ostensibly available in the
arsenal of medical treatment modalities. The patient does not know that
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there is an effective means for the beneficiary to register a request for
treatment with the MCO when the treating physician fails or refuses to
order the treatment, this "denial" of Medicaid or Medicare benefits will
fail to trigger the legally required notice and hearing rights. 34
In order to make the due process protections guaranteed by the
Constitution and statutes effective in protecting beneficiaries from
unlawful deprivation of their rights, there must be a way to notify
individuals each and every time those protections are triggered. Due to
the seriousness of the need for medical care, the inability of most
beneficiaries to pay the extremely high cost of care out of pocket, and the
risk of irremediable harm due to delay in access to medical care,
constitutional due process requires that Medicaid and Medicare
beneficiaries receive immediate and effective notice of every denial of
benefits and speedy review of all denials.
In fact, under the standards set out in Mathews and applied to managed
care in Grijalva, such review should, in at least some circumstances, occur
prior to the termination of benefits. 23' Therefore, MCOs or their
participating medical care providers should be required to notify
beneficiaries each and every time a treatment/coverage decision is made
of the beneficiaries' right to appeal that decision. Under a managed care
system, there is a substantial financial incentive to fail to give such notice,
which requires some means of enforcing this notice requirement on
MCOs and their medical providers.
This type of effective enforcement would require that an unbiased
observer, with the medical expertise necessary to be able to determine
what kind of medical treatment could be prescribed at each point in
a coverage determination has been made or that an appealable event
occurred. Id.
234. Mark A. Hall et al., JudicialProtection of Managed Care Consumers:An

Empirical Study of Insurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1055,
1060-61 (1996).

Managed care settings such as HMOs are less likely to produce coverage
disputes, even though they are more likely to deny treatment, because
coverage decisions are frequently made by treating physicians or by a
medical director in the physician's practice group... HMOs and other
forms of managed care ... use corporate and financial incentives to
motivate physicians not to make treatment recommendations in the first
place. This absence of patient knowledge that potentially beneficial care
is being foregone could easily account for the lack of coverage disputes
arising from managed care settings. Id.
235. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
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treatment, be continuously involved in the beneficiary's care, in order to
ensure that at each decision, proper notice of alternatives not chosen by
the care provider, and information about the right to appeal the
provider's decision, could be provided to the beneficiary.
An examination of the kind of a system that would be required in order
to meet the demands of due process in Medicaid and Medicare managed
care clearly demonstrates the logical and practical impossibility of such a
system. The number of medical treatment decisions made by a physician
in the care of each patient is infinite. Even in theory, it is impossible to
give Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries notice and hearing rights for
every treatment/coverage decision which excludes other potential
treatments. Yet, every such decision involves a decision by the care
provider to deny Medicaid or Medicare coverage for the treatments not
chosen.
In order to provide effective notice for all coverage/treatment
decisions, a system similar to the traditional fee-for-service system would
have to be superimposed on the managed care system, with an impartial
doctor observing all choices of the treating doctor and informing the
patient of all potential treatment choices not prescribed. The resulting
system would not be a managed care system as that term is currently
understood. It would certainly not provide the cost savings which are the
major justification for adoption of managed care in Medicaid and
Medicare. Furthermore, a system where a third party is introduced into
the doctor/patient relationship, to constantly warn and counsel the patient
regarding the treatment prescriptions, or lack thereof, by the patient's
own doctor,
would be utterly destructive of the doctor/patient therapeutic
• . . 236
relationship.
For all of these reasons, no one advocates the creation of
this kind of a hybrid of fee-for-service and managed care systems. Such a
hybrid system is neither practicable nor desirable. However, absent such
a system, there is no way even in theory to assure the due process
mandated
by, the
Constitution
in every
Medicaid/Medicare
treatment/coverage decision.

236. See discussion of the therapeutic importance of this relationship in Little,
supra note 216, at 1449-52.
237. The analysis in the Medicaid/Medicare context differs from that outlined
by the Supreme Court in Pegram, 530 U.S. - (2000), 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000). In
that case, the Court dealt with the interpretation of a statute (ERISA) creating a
scheme for regulating privately-provided health insurance benefits. The Court
concluded that extending ERISA's definition of fiduciary duty to include the duty
to make treatment/coverage decisions solely for the benefit of the covered person
would completely eliminate for-profit HMOs. Id. at 2156. The Court did not
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CONCLUSION

Medicaid and Medicare are entitlement programs, creating property
rights for qualified beneficiaries to receive covered medical treatment.
Under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution, and under the detailed Medicaid and Medicare statutory
and regulatory systems, beneficiaries are entitled to notice, hearing, and
decision by an impartial decision maker when health care coverage is
These rights of Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries are
denied.
unaltered by the change from fee-for-service health care to managed care.
Many critics of Medicaid and Medicare managed care have focused on
how the system of due process protections has broken down and how
beneficiaries' rights have been violated as a result."8 Many suggestions
have been made as to how such protections may be effectively reinstituted
However, under managed care,
in a managed care regime. 9
constitutionally mandated due process protections cannot be provided at
each point at which such protections are required.
Managed care, by its very nature, conflates the medical treatment
decision with the Medicaid/Medicare coverage decision, and imposes
financial incentives on the decision maker to deny coverage. Once the
coverage decision is inextricably entwined with the treatment decision, all
of the due process requirements attendant on the coverage decision are
also imposed on the treatment decision. Aside from statutory and
regulatory requirements, at an absolute minimum, the Constitution
requires that the Medicaid/Medicare coverage/treatment decisions be
made by an unbiased decision maker and be subject to basic notice and
appeal requirements.
All treatment decisions have also become coverage decisions; therefore
notice and hearing rights and an impartial decision maker must be
provided for every care decision made by a treating physician, including
believe that it could interpret the statute in a way which would so completely
contradict Congress' express intentions to promote the formation of HMOs. Id. at
2157. In the Medicaid/Medicare context, both the Supreme Court and Congress
are constrained by the mandates of the Constitution. Congress' desire to
encourage MCO participation in health care entitlement programs cannot
override constitutional due process requirements.
238. See, e.g., extended discussion of problems with Medicare MCO notice
and appeal procedures in Grijalva v. Shalala, 946 F. Supp. 747, 757-59 (D. Ariz.
1996).
239. See, e.g., Jost, supra note 18, at 39; Gladieux, supra note 46, at 61;
Emanuel & Goldman, supra note 200, at 636; Kinney, supra note 200, at 145.
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all decisions not to prescribe a given treatment. The set of all decisions to
prescribe or not to prescribe treatment is infinite. Any attempt to provide
notice, hearing and access to an unbiased decision maker in all decisions
would be logically impossible. If an attempt were made to provide due
process rights in all such decisions, the resulting system would no longer
be considered managed care as managed care is currently defined. Such a
system would be excruciatingly expensive, destructive of the
doctor/patient relationship, and both impracticable and undesirable.

